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Abstract
This paper explains, with tables and figures in detail, related processes in my simulations 
used for International Atlantic Economic Conference, Warsaw, on 10 April 2008. The purpose 
of this paper is that policy-makers by country are able to get useful results in simulations for defi-
cits and debts. Against a common understanding that budget and government’s activities produce 
no eranings, this paper endogenously measures a ‘minus’ rate of return and a ‘minus’ relative 
share of capital in the government sector after government saving becomes minus due to cumu-
lative huge deficits by year. The upper limits of the EMU rule of 3% and 60% each to GDP are 
reviewed not exogenously but endogenously. The simulations are composed of three aspects: (1) 
simulations to De Grauwe’s (2005) necessary condition for solvency of debts in the total econo-
my, (2) simulations to the financial degree of solvency, and (3) simulations to the endogenous 
degree of solvency. These three aspects respect the framework of De Grauwe, P. and the above 
(1) and (2) folow his intention but the above (3) overcomes his defects and measures numerical 
levels of solvency, presenting endogenous set of equations whose clue is the cost of capital and 
the valuation ratio.
The above (1) shows that his condition holds at deficit = 0 in the continuous time. The 
above (2) and (3) are measured by sector (the government and private sectors) and in the total 
economy under the rule of sum and, each shows the level of solvency using the magnitude/ 
degree, where (2) introduces the growth rate of output at convergence and (3) introduces both the 
rate of return and the growth rate of output each at convergence. The relationship between the 
interest rate of debts and ‘the deficit to debt’ by year is temporarily clarified in the financial 
degree of solvency. The degree of solvency is ultimately indicated in the endogenous degree of 
solvency, by using an endogenous valuation ratio using the cost of capital (i.e., the rate of return 
less the growth rate of output each at convergence). The horizontal asymptote of the valuation 
ratio is 1.0 and the vertical asymptote is zero, to the cost of capital. This implies that if the cost 
of capital is extremely high the valuation ratio reduces close to 1.0 and, if the cost of capital is 
close to zero, the valuation ratio is maximized. And, these results are al traced back to the rate 
of technological progress. If the valuation ratio at the government sector is 1.0, the valuation 
value of capital equals national net wealth, which presents an answer to Barro, R. (1974). For 
simulations, this paper uses both the data of Japan and the US 1997–2005 in KEWT data-sets 
(JER 11(2), 2007) and the data in case studies for the developed and developing countries. There 
is no contradiction between the equation in (1) and those in (2) and (3), where ‘the interest rate 
less the curent GDP growth rate’ in (1) coresponds with the cost of capital in (3).
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1.　Introduction
The EMU rule sets upper limits of deficits 3% and debts 60% each to GDP. The author in 
this paper clarifies a theoretical foundation of this rule and examines this rule, since in the litera-
ture there has been found no theoretical solution to the EMU rule that was derived empiricaly. 
De Grauwe, P. (6th ed., 2005, 225) showed a necessary condition for solvency of national debts, 
using diferential in the continuous time and externaly using the interest rate and the growth 
rate of GDP. The author endogenously reviews his forms and applies the author’s own equa-
tions to this subject. The author uses a set of case studies and simulations, concentrating on defi-
cits and debts and eliminating the influences of the balance of payments.
Consecutive deficits by year result in a minus government saving, similarly to the saving in 
the balance of payments. This is true. Nevertheless, government returns remain untouched or 
not measured in national accounts of the SNA. The relationship between operating surplus and 
profits/returns of the private sector, accordingly, remains in vague. De Grauwe (ibid.) takes the 
relationship between the interest rate and the growth rate of GDP, yet both being externaly 
given. Now, when an endogenous growth model is formulated as in Kamiryo, H. (2005b), the 
interest rate wil be replaced by an endogenous rate of return (as the natural rate of interest) and 
likewise, the growth rate of GDP wil be replaced by an endogenous growth rate of output (i.e., 
output as national disposable income that meets the equivalent to three aspects). In this case, 
how are returns by sector measured? When returns of the government sector are endogenously 
measured, the EMU rule wil be interpreted corectly with new facts from simulations. And the 
fiscal characteristics by country wil be clarified so as to justify urgent fiscal and financial 
policies.
The EMU rule has been reviewed by using gross or net investment due to the ofset of 
depreciation, where budget deficit or surplus is shown by the diference of saving and invest-
ment. The whole framework between the balance of payments and budget deficits was funda-
mentaly stated by Crowther, G. (1957) and later by Dornbusch, R. (1980).1) However, the 
author indicates that their frameworks must be modified in the case of minus saving by sector 
(the government and private sectors) and that this modification needs, at the macro level, utility 
measurement and an endogenous model. As a result, if related parameters were measured then 
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 1) Kamiryo, H. (2007b) discusses a whole framework of the balance of payments and budgeting in 
terms of saving and investment.
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theoretical adequacy and its proof to the EMU rule wil be possible. This is the author’s inten-
tion in this paper, where the endogenous cause and efect relationship between deficits & debts 
and related variables are theoreticaly and empiricaly shown.
Let the author first review Balassone, F. and Franco, D. (2000, 217–224) that compared 
the stylized version of the EMU rule with the proposal of Modigliani et al (1998), the German 
model, and the UK model (1997). This comparison is based on the total economy values, where 
each denominator is GDP (without connecting with the government output). The author, how-
ever, advocates that the total economy be divided into the government and private sectors under 
the rule of aggregate/sum and then the analytical results of the government sector wil be trans-
formed to a total economy base, by replacing the government output shown in denominators 
with the output of the total economy, using government share of output. This process is inevita-
ble to obtain endogenous results first at the government sector. Otherwise, the research stops at 
the calculation of saving, government saving, and private saving or corresponding investment, 
as shown in the literature. Then government returns remain stil unsolved.
To address and satisfy the above requirements, the author uses Kamiryo Endogenous 
World Table (KEWT) by country and by sector, 1960–2005 (2007b). In this paper, the author 
first shows the relationship between deficits and debts, after briefly reviewing De Grauwe’s 
framework. Second, the author deepens the relationships between deficits & debts and govern-
ment saving via government investment. For this purpose, the author simulates twelve cases 
using Cases 1 to 3 (combining government investment with total-economy investment) and 
each four sub-cases (four diferent levels of deficits & debts under a given balance of pay-
ments). These twelve cases are separately set for a developed and a developing country, where 
a given balance of payments and related parameters significantly difer. For these simulations, 
the original endogenous growth model was devised (without applying the speed of convergence 
to each time in the transitional path) so that the results of the curent situation and those at con-
vergence are directly connected. This direct approach to the situation at convergence is possible 
by using equations at convergence and simulating related variables by the rate of 
increase/decrease in the curent level of investment.
2.　Algorithm to the total economy, the government sector, and the private 
sector
The fiscal rule wil be searched when the total economy is divided into the government and 
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private sectors, where the rule of aggregate prevails. The author denotes subscript ‘G’ for the 
government sector and subscript ‘PRI’ for the private sector. In the current SNA (a system of 
national accounts 1993), the total economy is divided into non-financial corporations, financial 
corporations, general government, households (including private incorporated enterprises, and 
private non-profit institutions serving households. In the author’s model, wages paid to house-
holds are theoreticaly divided into the two sectors after redistribution of taxes. The above two-
sector model is justified by introducing the labor function to consumption by sector into the 
model, where wages and returns are theoretical instead of actual and, labor is replaced by wages.
C = CG + CPRI: Consumption, where CG is government consumption and CPRI is consumption of 
the private sector.
S = SG + SPRI: Saving, where SG is government saving and SPRI is saving of the private sector.
I = IG + IPRI: Net investment (after depreciation) I, where IG and IPRI are each net investment of 
the government and private sectors. Net is used since saving is net; not gross before 
depreciation.
Y = C + S: National disposable income (NDI), which is shown by Y, difers from GDP and the 
model uses the Y = NDI base instead of the GDP base. Note that NDI includes net primary 
income from abroad if it is available.
BOP = S - I: The balance of payments. This presents a base in an open economy.
DD º SG - IG: budget deficit, where deficit expresses minus. Deficit is replaced by DD = (S - 
SPRI) - (I - IPRI). Similarly, debt D expresses minus.
W = WG + WPRI: Theoretical wages, where WG is those of the government sector and WPRI is 
those of the private sector.
P = PG + PPRI: Theoretical returns, where PG is those of the government sector and PPRI is 
those of the private sector.
Y = W + P: Theoretical national disposable income, which equals actual NDI by using the wage 
function of consumption/utility by sector (soon below): W + P = Y = C + S. This is expressed 
reversely using a notion that ‘wages are mostly used for consumption goods while returns are 
mostly used for capital goods,’ as suggested by Lindahl, E. (1969, 54–57),
Y = W + P = (WC + WS) + (PC + PS) = C + S, where ‘equivalent of three aspects,’ first designed 
by Meade, J. E. and Stone, J. R. N. (1969, 344–345), now exactly holds.
YG = WG + PG: Government output and its theoretical wages and returns.
YPRI = WPRI + PPRI: Private output and its theoretical wages and returns.
Theoretical wages and returns are measured as folows: For the total economy, 
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  or  is used under  and c = C / Y, where rho is the dis-
count rate of consumption and r is the discount rate of saving, which equals the rate of return. 
At the macro level by year, utility social welfare is shown each as the present value of consump-
tion and that of saving each in infinite time, where utility social welfare of consumption 
equals that of saving.2) As a result, P = Y - W is obtained by offseting both utility social 
welfares. The wage function of consumption in the US 1960–2005 is shown as 
  However, the above measurement of wages and returns 
must be consistent with theoretical capital measurement, which wil be justified by the matching 
test and the smoothening test.3)
For the government sector, the wage function of consumption is neutraly specified by 
  = 1.0, where WG = CG holds. As a result, PG = YG - WG is obtained. For the private sec-
tor, both wages and returns are obtained each as the diference between income and wages 
(directly; without using the wage function of consumption): WPRI = W - WG and PPRI = YPRI - 
WPRI.
Finaly, the curent given data in the data-sets are: budget surplus or deficit, DD = SG - IG, 
lending or debt D, government consumption, CG, government net investment, IG, in addition to 
the data of the total economy such as the balance of payments, S - I, consumption, C, net invest-
ment, I, and population, L.
3.　Methodology for the endogenous fiscal rule
The author wil examine the EMU rule for deficits and debts, starting with De Grauwe’s 
framework and shifting his diferential to the corresponding diference at the discrete time. His 
principle does not change regardless of continuous or discrete yet, at the discrete time, new facts 
are found when an endogenous growth model is introduced into its framework. By so doing, the 
cost of capital and the valuation ratio are measured at convergence, which wil be discussed in 
the next section. Among others, the most decisive finding in the condition for solvency is that 
W C rhor= ( )/ 1− = ( )α c rhor/ 1− =α W Y/
rho
r c c( ) = − +13 301 22 608 10 5662. . . .
rho
r G
( )
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 2) This idea starts with Cass’ (1964) ‘instantaneous’ utility at the micro level.
 3) The matching test and the smoothening test by year guarantee the consistency among each item of 
the data-sets in KEWT so that the capital-output ratio by country and sector is measured theoreti-
caly and without revise in the long run. There is no data-set that publishes capital and the capital-
output ratio by sector today, except for those of the corporate sector by OECD (see Schreyer, P. 
(2004a and b), since Pen World Table stopped publishing the capital-labor ratio after 1995 by some 
reasons (see, PWT 6.2, 2004).
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the cost of capital is least or the valuation ratio is maximized when deficits and debts are zero, 
which is the interpretation of his diferential. His diference between deficits and the product of 
debts and ‘the interest rate of debts less the growth rate of GDP’ externaly shows the level of 
insolvency yet, the diference between his interest rate and the rate of return at convergence 
does not difer significantly. This implies that the market interest rate and an endogenous rate of 
return do not difer significantly when the neutrality of financial assets is respected by the cen-
tral bank.
According to De Grauwe, P. (2005, 147–148, 222–225), the relationship between debts,  
and deficits, b, are formulated using   where g is the sum of government 
expenditures (excluding interest paid) and investment, t is taxes, r is the interest rate of debts, 
and x is the nominal growth rate of GDP. This equation holds at the current situation without 
introducing endogenous contents. The author tests this equation and examines it from the folow-
ing three points of view: (1) the relationship between deficits and g - t, (2) the relationship 
between deficits and debts, and (3) the relationship between interest paid and theoretical rate of 
return.
For these examinations, the author changes some of his notations: (1) surplus is plus and 
deficit is minus, and similarly, lending is plus and debt is minus, where b is expressed as -b, 
and (2) t - g is shown by g - t. Also, the author uses notations that are consistent with KEWT 
data-sets, where his ‘b’ is expressed by ‘d’ (since B is the qualitative to quantitative invest-
ment), his ‘g’ by CG + IG, his ‘t’ by tAX, his ‘r’ by r(DEBT), his ‘x’ by  Thus,
   (1)
For solvency, his equation shows:  = 0, then (r - x)b = t - g holds. This comes from G -
T + rB =  + dM / dt, where dM / dt = 0. His (r - x)b = t - g under  = 0 is shown by using 
the author’s notation, d º D / Y, where ‘d’ shows lending and ‘-d’ shows debt.
   (2)
where taxes are equal to the sum of expenditures, investment, and interest paid, each of the gov-
ernment sector. Interest paid is RDEBT = rDEBT・D.
Eq. 2 implies the folowing two points where the author cites some of his propositions:
1. If the nominal interest rate exceeds the growth rate of output at convergence, then, the gov-
ernment must make sure that the primary budget, tAX -(cG + iG), has a surplus.
4)
b,
b g t r x b= − + −( ) ( ) ,
gY
* .
Δd t c i r g dAX G G DEBT Y= − + + −( ( )) ( ) .( )
*
b
dB
dt
b
( )( ) ( ) ,*r g d t c i dDEBT Y AX G G− − = − + =under Δ 0
―　　―22
 4) This statement is consistent with the concept of ‘the present value constraint’ to budget and the bal-
ance of payments (see Ahmed, S. & Rogers, J. H. (1995), which the author wil comment when the 
cost of capital at convergence is taken into consideration below).
How to Simulate Budgeting towards Endogenous Rules of Deficits and Debts?
2. If not, debts wil increase without limit.
Eq. 2 wil be replaced by the next Eq. 3 when the rate of return at convergence, r*, is used 
instead of the nominal interest rate.
  (3)
The diference between the author’s Eq. 3 and De Grauwe’s Eq. B19.5 is that the author uses 
an endogenous cost of capital,   ,instead of ‘the nominal interest rate less the nominal 
growth rate of output at the current situation. The author cals Eq. 3 the financial degree 
of solvency. Then, the above proposition of De Grauwe is restated as the endogenous 
proposition:
1. If the cost of capital at convergence is plus, then, the government must make sure that the 
primary budget, tAX-(cG + iG), has a surplus.
2. If not, debts wil increase without limit.
This revised proposition of the author implies that primary balance wil be plus if the cost of 
capital at convergence of the total economy is plus. Neglecting the diference between the 
current/actual growth rate of GDP and the endogenous growth rate of output at convergence, 
the diference between the above two propositions comes from the diference between the nomi-
nal interest rate and the endogenous rate of return at convergence. Furthermore, according to the 
rule of aggregate, ‘the total economy = the government sector + the private sector’ holds in the 
endogenous growth model of KEWT. This is interpreted such that economic activities of the pri-
vate sector are calculated by those of the total economy determined by the balance of payments 
less those of the government sector determined by budget (deficit & debts).
It is convenient for the rule of aggregate to use the government share of output. First, in the 
case of the growth rate of government output at convergence,
Similarly to 
   (4)
To make the rule of aggregate to hold, the denominator of  must be the output of the total 
economy, Y, instead of government output, YG. Then, the use of the government share of output, 
YG / Y, is inevitable:
   (5)
Thus, Eq. 6 holds under the rule of aggregate.
   (6)
Second, the rate of return at convergence is obtained by taking advantage of the Petersburg 
( )( ) ( ).* *r g d t c iY AX G G− − = − +
r gY
* *
−
g i Y Y YY
* * *( ) ( ) / ,= − = −1 0 0β
g i Y Y YY G G G G G G( )
* * *
( ) ( )( ) ( ) / .= − = −1 0 0β
gY G( )
*
g
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
g
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y G Y
G G
G
G
Y PRI Y
PRI GPRI
PRI
PR
( ) /
*
( ) /
*
≡ = ⋅ ≡ = ⋅
Δ Δ Δ Δ
and I
Y
.
g g gY Y G Y Y PRI Y
*
( ) /
*
( ) /
* .= +
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coeficient5) that connects the rate of return with the growth rate of output at convergence, 
where the Petersburg coeficient is  in the total economy and  in the gov-
ernment sector.
  (7)
And,   (8)
where the government and private shares of capital are KG / K and KPRI / K.
Finaly, the cost of capital at convergence,  is similarly shown, avoiding the use of 
 
  (9)
The cost of capital coresponds with ‘the interest rate less the GDP growth rate’ in De Grauwe’s 
equation.
As a result, the valuation ratio, v = V / K, is obtained as the rate of return divided by the cor-
responding cost of capital at convergence.
  
(10-1)
   (10-2)
The horizontal asymptote of the valuation ratio is 1.0 and vertical asymptote crosses the origin, 
when the X axis shows the cost of capital. The valuation value of capital corresponds with 
national net wealth in the literature: EG = VG (for discussions, see Baro, R. (1974, 1989). If vG 
= 1.0, capital equals net wealth in the government sector. If vG < 1.0, where deficits and debts 
always exist to some extent, net wealth reduces by KG -VG. ‘A set of Eqs. 7, 8, 9, and 10’ exists 
as the ‘endogenous’ degree of solvency.
When the valuation ratio is not measured endogenously, the leverage of debts to net 
equity/wealth, E, of a country is simply measured using E = K + D:
lEV = -D / (K + EABROAD) + D) = -D / E, if the present value of net primary income from 
α β/( )*i ⋅ α βG G Gi/( )*⋅
r g
i
r g
iY G Y G
G
G G
* *
*
*
( )
*
*
.=
⋅
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟ = ⋅
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
α
β
α
βand
r
K K
K
K
r
K K
K
KG K
G G
G
G
PRI K
PRI PRI
PRI
PRI
/
*
* *
/
*
* *
.≡ = ⋅ ≡ = ⋅
Π Π Π Π
and
r gY
* * ,−
r gG Y G
*
( )
* :−
r g r g r gY G K Y G Y PRI K Y PRI Y
* *
/
*
( ) /
*
/
*
( ) /
*( ) ( ).− = − + −
v r r g v r r g and v r r g
v
Y G G G Y G G G G Y G= − = − = −
* * * * *
( )
* * *
( )
*/( ), /( ), /( ).
= − = − + −r r g r r g r r gY G K G K Y G Y PRI K PRI K Y PR
* * *
/
*
/
*
( ) /
*
/
*
/
*
(/( ) /( ) ( I Y) /
* ).
v
g
r g
v
i
r
r r
Y
Y
i
= +
−
=
− ⋅
=
− ( )⋅1
*
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*
* *
*
*
, .and where is a key
α
α β ββα
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 5) The related equations were wholy discussed in Kamiryo, H. (2007a), whose earlier ideas came 
from Durand, D. (1957) and Phelps, E. S. (1961, 1965, and 1966), although both were exogenously 
discussed, and whose endogenous idea comes from Kamiryo, H. (2004). Here, ‘endogenous’ 
implies that the data of national accounts and the data for the Cobb-Douglas production function are 
consistently used.
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abroad (EABROAD) is taken into consideration. Or,
   (10)
The relationship between the capital-output ratio and the ratio of money (M2) to output 
(Marshal’s k) is essential to the test of the neutrality of financial assets from real assets. This 
wil be discussed with related equations in a separate paper.
4.　Preliminary findings using Japan and the US and case study of fiscal rule
The above methodology is first applied to the data-sets of Japan and the US, 1997–2005 in 
KEWT and second, to the case study to fiscal rule. The data-sets of KEWT are derived by using 
the equations to parameters and variables at convergence and recursive programming to the tran-
sitional path after measuring the speed of convergence. The comparison of Japan and the US 
takes data from the data-sets of KEWT. However, for the case study of fiscal rule that uses the 
percentage changes in net investments of the total economy and the government sector, the 
author simplifies the algorism that necessitates the speed of convergence, which the author cals 
the simplified algorism.
4.1　Empirical results using Japan and the US
For empirical findings in deficits and debts, this section tests the condition for solvency by 
using Eq. 3,  in the financial degree of solvency. In this case, 
the interest rate remains externaly given but an endogenous growth rate of output is measured 
at convergence.
The purpose of the above analysis is to test (1) the difference between deficits 
  and taxes less government expenditures and net investment,   
(2) the difference between deficits and the condition for solvency to primary balance, 
  and (3) the diference between tAX - (cG + iG) and  The rate 
of increase/decrease of debts, is shown by p º DD / D. This rate connects DD with D in the dis-
crete time and is used for confirmation of related results of Eq. 2. Assuming that deficit is con-
stant over the infinite years, p º DD / D shows a kind of the internal rate of return and thus, is 
able to compare with the interest rate of debts. The author stresses that p º DD / D is meaning-
ful in showing the trend of fiscal policy in the long run. The results are shown in Figures 2 and 
3 (in detail, see Tables A1, A2, A3, and A4 in Appendix). These tables and figures use the data-
d D K l d d E V K BOP Y
l
D K EV D K D K
EV G
/ / /
(
/ /( ), / .≡ − ≡ − = = =and where if the1 0
) /( ) / .= − + = −D K D D EG G for the government Sector
( )( ) ( ),*r g d t c iDEBT Y AX G G− − = − +
( / ),Δ Δd D Y= t c iAX G G− +( ),
( )( ),*r g dDEBT Y− − ( )( ).
*r g dDEBT Y− −
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sets of KEWT 1.07, whose original data come from International Financial Statistics Year
books and Government Finance Statistics Yearbooks, International Monetary Fund.
The author uses ‘four cases,’ to test the levels of equal-relationships among three items 
(the growth rate of output at convergence,   and the interest rate, r(DEBT). Four 
cases are: Case 1 XXX shows   Case 2 OOX shows   Case 3 
XOO shows  Case 4 OOO shows  Each case has its four sub-
cases.6)
Here, the author wil use additional equations that show some constraints to deficit and the 
above p º DD / D. Taxes are equal to government output, since DD = Tax - (CG + IG + R(DEBT) 
and thus, TAX = YG = (SG - IG) + CG + IG + R(DEBT), where output includes interest paid. For pri-
mary balance, DDPRIMARY = CG + SG holds, where government expenditures do not include inter-
est paid. Thus, using, YG / Y,
  (11)
The government share of output is a sort of tax rate whose taxes include indirect tax.
Then, a base for ‘the present-value constraint to deficit’ in the literature7) wil be:
  (12)
where  and, the deficit and interest rate are assumed to be constant in infi-
nite time. The above p º DD / D is another expression of the interest rate, where r(DEBT) = p 
holds if deficit is constant over the infinite years.
Back to the above tests, (1), (2), and (3); conclusively, first for (1), deficit always equals 
‘taxes less government expenditures and net investment.’ This implies that taxes equal consump-
tion and saving of the government sector but exclude interest paid. Then, if taxes reduce, do peo-
ple enjoy a smal government? Assuming that government expenditures and investment remain 
unchanged, the decrease in taxes equals the increase in deficit. In another words, the size of gov-
ernment is determined by the sum of government expenditures and investment.
Then, the above tests (2) and (3) become the same. (2) or (3) tests the diference between 
g d dY
* , / ,π ≡ Δ
g rY DEBT
*
( ).≠ ≠π g rY DEBT* ( ).= ≠π
g rY DEBT
*
( ).≠ =π g rY DEBT* ( ).= = −π
T
Y
Y YAX G= / , where
D D r DEBT= Δ / ,( )
D D t r DEBT= ( )=∞ +Δ Σ 0 11 ( )
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 6) Supplementary four cases are: Case 2 OOX shows   yet using debt = 290000 
instead of debt = 250000 in Case 2. Case 1-2 XXX shows   yet primary-based as 
deficit less interest. Case 1–3 XXX shows  yet assuming that taxes are the same as 
those in non-primary deficit. Case 4 O0O shows  with no deficit.
 7) The literature tests both the balance of payments and deficits simultaneously from the viewpoint of 
sustainability. For example, see Ahmed, S. & Rogers, J. H. (1995). The paper uses the PVC test in 
econometrics while the author uses theoretical equations at convergence. For the comments on the 
above paper, see case study in the next section that discusses the cost of capital.
g rY DEBT
*
( ),= ≠π
g rY DEBT
*
( ),≠ ≠π
g rY DEBT
*
( ),≠ ≠π
g rY DEBT
*
( ),= =π
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deficit and the condition for solvency. Before this test, let the author compare the value of the 
condition for solvency,  by year, by case, and by country. In Japan, this value 
had been minus earlier in 1997 and slightly plus after 1997. In the US, this value has been 
minus since 1997 yet, gradualy less minus or turning to plus later. Exception is Case O0O as 
a benchmark, where there is neither deficit nor surplus and   holds. This 
implies that solvency is atained at Dd = 0. This result corresponds with De Grauwe’s diferen-
tial of ‘if   then  holds.’
Then, the difference between Dd and   has shown minus in Japan, and 
gradualy more minus except for that in 2005. In the US, this diference has been minus and 
plus since 1997 yet, the range of this diference is comparatively much narrow. Recal that 
Japan’s debts to output are the worst case among countries. The above results imply that the 
level of the diference of   is useful for policy-makers. A wrong idea of 
‘with growth first, primary solvency wil folow’ is denied. The test of the above diference is, 
nevertheless, not enough since the interest rate, r(DEBT), may be arbitrary due to a strong fiscal 
policy to decrease the burden of interest payment. An idea that the central bank should be abso-
lutely neutral to fiscal and financial policies wil be denied, as shown in Japan. To compare 
r(DEBT) with an endogenous rate of return at convergence, r
*, wil be inevitable, which wil be dis-
cussed soon below.
In short, the author compared Japan with the US from the viewpoint of De Grauwe’s con-
dition for solvency in this section, by using the growth rate of output at convergence, which is 
more stable than that at the curent situation. Nevertheless, it is expected that the interest rate at 
the market principle should be examined by the rate of return at convergence.
4.2　Case study of fiscal rule: a developed country versus developing country
For empirical findings in deficits and debts, this section tests Eq. 3,   tAX - 
(cG + iG), by presenting two typical economies; a developed country and a developing country
8) 
and simulating the changes in net investments of the total economy and the government sector. 
The rates of increase/decrease in net investment of the total economy are eight: 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 
0.4, -0.1, -0.2, -0.3, -0.4. Each simulation is denoted as simu 1, simu 2, simu 3, simu 4, 
simu -1, simu -2, simu -3, or simu -4. The rates of increase/decrease in net investment of the 
( )( ),*r g dDEBT Y− −
( )( )*r g dDEBT Y− − = 0
b = 0, ( )r x b t g− = −
( )( )*r g dDEBT Y− −
Δd r g dDEBT Y− − −( )( )
*
( )( )* *r g dY− − =
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 8) Each item of the two typical economies uses close-to-actual data, after testing BRICs and other 
countries in KEWT 1.07, 1960–2005, so that the results are typical in the comparison between a 
developed country and a developing one.
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government sector are also eight: 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8, -0.2, -0.4, -0.6, -0.8. Each simulation is 
similarly denoted as simu 1, simu 2, simu 3, simu 4, simu -1, simu -2, simu -3, or simu -4. 
For each simulation, three cases are distinguished by the combination of the changes in net 
investments between the total economy and the government sector: Case 1 only simulates the 
change in net investment of the total economy (where, a given net investment of the govern-
ment sector remains unchanged). Case 2 only simulates the change in net investment of the gov-
ernment sector (where, a given net investment of the total economy remains unchanged). Case 3 
simulates both changes in net investments of the total economy and the government sector. For 
each case, four sub-cases aiming at the influence on test ratios by the level of Dd and d are set 
up: The sub-case ‘-1’ shows the condition of Dd = -0.03 and d = -0.6. The ‘-2’ shows the con-
dition of Dd = -0.015 and d = -0.3. The ‘-3’ shows the condition of Dd = 0 and d = 0. And, the 
‘-4’ shows the condition of Dd = 0.03 and d = 0.1. As a result, Case 1 is divided into 1-1, 1-2, 
1-3, and 1-4. Case 2 is divided into 2-1, 2-2, 2-3, and 2-4. And, Case 3 is divided into 3-1, 3-2, 
3-3, and 3-4.
The above cases, furthermore, compare a ‘developed’ country with a ‘developing’ country. 
Before simulation, the BOP / Y of the former is -0.0655 while the BOP / Y of the later is 
0.0551. The i of the former is 0.1 in Cases 1 and 2 and, 0.075 in Case 3, while the i of the later 
is 0.1335 for al three cases. The utility coeficient of the former is 1.13151 for al three cases, 
while the utility coeficient of the later is 0.9 in Cases 1 and 2 and 0.8 in Case 3. To make it 
easy to compare, the growth rate of population/labor in Cases 1 and 2 is set 0.01203 in both 
countries, while that of Case 3 is set 0.0 in both countries. The growth rate of labor of the gov-
ernment sector in Cases 1 and 2 is set 0.01543 in both countries, while that of Case 3 is set 0.0 
in both countries. Note that at n = 0 the per capita output growth rate equals the output growth 
rate, which is more convenient for comparison.
The purpose of the above simulations is to find: (1) How does the growth rate of output at 
convergence difer by the change in net investment and by the level of deficits and debts? (2) 
How does the relationship at convergence between the rate of technological progress and a = 
W*・r* difer by the change in net investment and by the level of deficits and debts? (3) How do 
the condition for solvency, the cost of capital, the valuation ratio, the Petersburg coeficient, and 
the government share of output difer by the change in net investment and by the level of defi-
cits and debts? The results are shown in Tables 1, 2, 3, and 4, with Figures 4, 5, 6, and 7.9) 
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These results wil be useful to the interpretation of the EMU’s fiscal rule and contribute to 
improve underlying principles in fiscal and financial policies.
First of al, let the author find the characteristics of the growth rate of output at conver-
gence,  in an open economy. The rate of technological progress as the base of  is deter-
mined as the product of the ratio of net investment to output, i, and 1 - b*. The balance of 
payments to output, once saving is initialy given, changes with the rate of increase/decrease of 
a given net investment, resulting in the change in   At the same time, the capital-output 
ratio, W≡ K / Y, is tightly related to 1 - b
*. Figure 1 showed the elasticity of b* with respect 
gY
* , gY
*
gY
* .
―　　―29
Figure 1 Elasticity values of beta with respect to the capital-output ratio and the ratio of net 
investment to output
Note: There are slight diferences of elasticity values between developed and developing coun-
tries. The above results suggest each optimum range of the capital-output ratio and the 
ratio of net investment to output. The upper limit of the capital-output ratio of the total 
economy among countries is roughly 2.5 and that of the private sector is roughly 2.0 
among countries due to global competition. The level of the ratio of net investment to out-
put among developing countries is much higher than that among developed countries. 
When the ratio of net investment to output is less than 0.1, the value of beta* is unstable, 
which is a strong reason why poor countries cannot get rid of their situation.
Hideyuki Kamiryo
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Figure 2　De Grauwe’s (2005) condition for primary solvency: Japan 1997–2005
Note: Case XXX shows the actual situation by year, where g d d rY DEBT
*
( )/ .≠ ≠Δ
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to the capital-output ratio. If the capital-output ratio of the government sector is extremely high 
as in Japan, the capital-output ratio of the total economy of a country wil be much higher than 
those of other developed countries. This implies that the rate of technological progress of the 
total economy have to be lower than those of other developed countries. Besides, if deficits and 
debts are huge, government saving is extremely minus, which causes the crowding-out of net 
investment in the private sector. For example, the current rate of increase in net investment of 
the private sector remains minus in Japan. Therefore, the more plus the balance of payments is 
the higher the growth rate of output at convergence yet, the increase in the capital-output must 
be carefuly examined.
The top of Figure 4 shows that the growth rate of output at convergence,   is much 
higher in a developing country than that in a developed country. This is due to the diferences 
of four items; the balance of payments, i, W º K / Y, and 1 - b
*. The middle and botom of Fig-
ure 4 compare  with the ratio of saving to output, s = S / Y, for both a developed country and 
a developing country. Under a current given BOP, the higher the change in net investment is, 
the higher  and s. It is found, however, that the value of s is influenced much more than  
by the change in net investment. Also, even if the ratio of saving is significantly minus under a 
minus BOP, the growth rate of output decreases rapidly with the decrease in net investment yet 
it remains always plus. The value of s = 0, therefore, wil guarantee the coresponding minimum 
  and has its meaning towards a limit to Dd = DD / Y .Furthermore, d = D / Y decreases with 
the positive change in net investment and d = D / Y increases with the negative change in net 
investment. In this respect, investment is neutral to saving and not an evil (under the condition 
of  and, investment has its own range of optimum for sustainability.
Now In detail, Table 1 shows the simulations by case, where observing ratios remain 
unchanged for sub-cases of Dd = -0.03 and d = -0.6, Dd = -0.015 and d = -0.3, Dd = 0 and d = 
0, and Dd = 0.03 and d = 0.1. Observing ratios are five; the growth rate of output, 1 - b*, the 
capital-output ratio, the relative share of capital, and the rate of return, each at convergence. For 
comparison, the author exceptionaly added  (that varies by the level of Dd and d) to five 
ratios. A reason is that if  government investment should be reduced and vice 
versa. Table 1 shows that the higher the rate of increase of net investment, the higher  alpha, 
and the rate of return, and vice versa, and that the higher the rate of increase of net investment 
the lower W and 1 - b*, and vice versa. The above results for a developed country are similar to 
those for a developing country. These imply that the above five ratios are determined only by 
the balance of payments. Note that the balance of payments wil be influenced by a level of defi-
gY
* ,
gY
*
gY
* gY
*
gY
*
1 1− > −β βG* * )
1− βG*
( ) ( ),* *1 1− < −β βG
gY
* ,
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Figure 3　De Grauwe’s (2005) condition for primary solvency: the US 1997–2005
Note: Case XXX shows the actual situation by year, where g d d rY DEBT
*
( )/ .≠ ≠Δ
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Figure 4 Simulation of the growth rate of output and the ratio of saving to output, in the bal-
ance of payments and budget: Cases 1, 2, and 3
Note: If investment increases (by either Case 1, 2, or 3) under a fixed balance of payments, 
BOP and saving increase by the increase of net investment: S = (S - I - DI) + I + DI. 
This is because the current Y and C each increases by the increase in the growth rate of 
output at convergence that occurs by the increase in investment.
 The higher positively the BOP, the higher is the   at convergence and, vice versa, 
depending on the capital-output ratio of the total economy which determines 1 - b*.
gY
*
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cits and debts if this level is extremely minus (in other words, if the saving of the total economy 
decreases with a significant minus government saving).
The results of the simulations to Cases 1 and 2 are moderate: the changes in net investment 
of either the total economy or the government sector do not influence the above five ratios, 
much less than the results to Case 3, where the net investment of both the total economy and the 
government sector changes at the same time. As a result, the author uses Case 3 to find new 
facts in the fiscal rule hereafter.
Table 2 shows, using Case 3, deficits, debts, and the condition for solvency, and each com-
ponent of   in the government sector. The purpose of this table is to find how 
severely deficits and debts influence each of   If   is miserable, then 
  of the total economy wil severely hit, resulting in a low growth rate of output at 
convergence as in Japan. Table 2 also compares a developed country that has a high level of the 
government capital-output ratio by sub-case with a developing country that has a low level of 
the government capital-output ratio by sub-case. In the sub-case 3-1 (i.e., Dd = -0.03 and d 
= -0.6, as the limit of the EMU rule), the government capital-output ratio is much higher than 
that of sub-case 3-3 of Dd = 0 and d = 0 as a benchmark. This implies that fiscal decisions 
directly influence the rate of technological progress via the capital-output ratio. Furthermore, 
both aG and  in  become severely minus along with the aggravation of deficits 
and debts (when Case 3-3 turns to Case 3-1). This implies that when the condition for solvency 
is hopeless it is dificult for the government to get rid of the aggravation of 
Figure 5 shows the influences of deficits and debts on primary balance to output, by using 
  The higher negatively this value, the riskier the condition for primary 
solvency. This is typical in Case 3-1 in a developed and developing countries, where Dd = 
-0.03 and d = -0.6.
Table 3 and Figure 6 show the cost of capital, the valuation ratio, and the Petersburg coef-
ficient,  to connect the rate of return with the growth rate of output both at conver-
gence, in the government sector. Since the growth rate of output at convergence remains 
unchanged between Cases 3-1, 3-2, 3-3, and 3-4, the rate of return and/or the Petersburg coefi-
cient must change. With the aggravation of deficits and debts (when Case 3-3 turns to Case 3-
1), the cost of capital becomes more minus in both developed and developing countries. This 
finding is slightly accelerated when the rate of increase/decrease in net investment increases, 
and vice versa. As a result, the valuation ratio is consistent with the above findings. The farther 
negatively the condition for solvency becomes the less the valuation ratio is below zero. The 
αG G Gr= ⋅Ω* *
αG G Gr= ⋅Ω* *. αG G Gr= ⋅Ω* *
αG r= ⋅Ω* *
rG
* αG G Gr= ⋅Ω* *
αG G Gr= ⋅Ω* *.
Δd r g dDEBT Y− − −( )( ).( )
*
α βG G Gi/( ),*⋅
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Figure 5　Simulation of primary balance to output and deficits and debts: Case 3
Note: The primary balance SG - IG (excluding interest) changes more significantly at Cases 3-1 
and 3-2 under deficits than those at Cases 3-3 and 3-4 under surplus. At Case 3-1 (Dd = 
-0.03 and d = -0.6), why does the primary balance improves with more investment or 
aggravates with less investment? This is because positive investment enhances  and r* 
and improves the BOP and saving under a fixed Dd = -0.03.
gY
*
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Figure 6 Simulation of the cost of capital, the valuation ratio, and the Petersburg coefficient, 
each at convergence: Case 3
Note: Case 3-3 has neither deficit nor debt and presents a base for deficit/surplus and 
debt/lending. Case 3-1 shows the worst and Case 3-4 shows the best, where Case 3 
changes net investment of both the total economy and the government sector at the same 
time. The above results indicate that an optimum situation exists under Case 3-3, where 
Dd = d = 0 and the valuation ratio is the highest with the least cost of capital. For the 
wage function of consumption, = 13.301c2 - 22.608c + 10.566 is used.rhor( )
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Figure 7 The neutrality of the interest rate and the government share of output by simulation 
in Case 3
Note: (r(DEBT) - gY 
*)and (r* - gY 
*)are independent of Dd and d. Yet, if the interest rate is deter-
mined so as to minimize r(DEBT) - r
*, the neutrality of money is guaranteed.
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more the rate of increase/decrease in net investment increases, slightly less the valuation ratio 
becomes.
Finaly, Table 4 for Case 3 shows the condition for solvency by comparing De Grauwe’s 
interest rate with the author’s rate of return at convergence:   versus 
  and  and  This is also shown in Figure 7, folowed by the 
government share of output by the level of Dd and d. The higher negatively the level of Dd and 
d are, the more the government share of output.
These implies that the cost of capital, the valuation ratio, and the government sector’s share 
of output are consistent with not only the condition for solvency but also the endogenous 
growth model as a whole, compared with De Grauwe’s external condition for solvency alone.
Furthermore, the author indicates some interpretation to the present-value constraint to 
deficit, or PVC (for its origin, see Eq. 12 under   particularly citing Ahmed, S. & 
Rogers, J. H. (1995, 353-355). According to the paper, there are two diferent results of the 
PVC test under stochastic and non-stochastic conditions, assuming that if PVC = 0, deficit is on 
a sustainable path: (1) the real interest rate > the growth rate of economy holds (which is caled 
‘under dynamic eficiency’), as in ‘much of the literature,’ and (2) the real interest rate < the 
growth rate of economy holds, as shown in the tests of Wilcox (1989) and Abel et al (1989). 
The above (1) corresponds with the author’s cost of capital at convergence > 0 and the above 
(2) corresponds with the author’s cost of capital at convergence < 0; both by assuming that 
 and the balance of payments = 0. According to the author’s point of view, the difer-
ence comes from the Petersburg coeficient,   depending on the relationship between 
the relative share of capital, the ratio of net investment to output, and the quantitative to total 
investment, b*. The author concludes that the valuation ratio is more important than the PVC 
test that varies by the above Petersburg coeficient.
5.　Examination of the EMU’ fiscal rule: towards endogenous fiscal rule
First the author wil examine and interpret the contents of the EMU’s fiscal rule and sec-
ond, propose the author’s endogenous fiscal rule. According to the upper limit of the EMU rule, 
the ratio of deficit to output, Dd º DD / Y, is -0.03 and the ratio of debts to output, d º D / Y, is 
-0.6, where, output = GDP and surplus and lending are shown each plus, which difers from De 
Grauwe’s sign.
First, the author clarifies three aspects in the EMU rule:
( )( )( )
*r g dDEBT Y− −
( )( )* *r g dY− − ( )( )
*r gDEBT Y− ( ).
* *r gY−
gY
* ),= 0
r r DEBT
*
( )=
α β/ ,*i ⋅
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1.　The balance of payments and deficits are each expressed as the diference between saving 
and investment of the total economy or the government sector. For the above case, gross 
(including depreciation) and net (excluding depreciation) have no problem. However, there are a 
few problems as a whole. One is that the lower limit is zero for gross investment while a minus 
value exists for net investment. When minus returns in the government sector are measured due 
to minus saving that is caused by huge deficits, as in the author’s model, it is inevitable to take 
the ‘net’ base. Balassone F. and Franco D. (2000, 217–224) cites and compares the proposal of 
Modigliani et al (1998), the German model, and the UK model, with the EMU rule, where the 
German model is only based on gross.10) Therefore, the above literature only reviews the level 
of saving by the level of investment. There is no step into returns using the saving in the govern-
ment sector.
2.　The rule for budget analysis is wel examined by using corresponding ratios in the govern-
ment sector: the ratio of government saving to government output, sG, and the ratio of govern-
ment net investment to government output, iG, where sG = (sG - iG) + iG based on SG = (SG - IG) 
+ IG, under sG = SG / YG, iG = IG / YG and YG = government output. However, in the above com-
parison of Modigliani et al, the German, and the UK models, each denominator is not govern-
ment output but GDP or output, as shown by   where   and 
  A reason is that there is no systematic method for dividing the total economy into 
the government and private sectors. The author proposes this method, first connecting 
  with  by using the government share of output, YG / Y. Note 
that the author uses national disposable income, Y, instead of GDP, where Y / GDP is 80 to 90% 
by country and by year and Y is more consumption or sustainability oriented in the long run.
3.　From the viewpoint of solvency, the relationship between deficits and debts must be exam-
ined, by shifting De Grauwe’s external relationship between the interest rate and the current 
growth rate of output to endogenous values such as the cost of capital and the valuation ratio, as 
the author clarified in this paper.
Taking into consideration the results of the comparison of Japan with the US 1997–2005 
and also the case study by the level of deficits and debts each to output, new findings are sum-
marized as folows:
s s i iG
Y
G
Y
G
Y
G
Y
= −( ) + , s sG
Y
G
G
Y
Y= ⋅
i iG
Y
G
G
Y
Y= ⋅ .
s s i iG G G G= − +( ) s s i iGY GY GY GY= −( ) + ,
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10) The constraint of each model is commonly shown by using the government ‘saving’ derived from 
  (1) Proposal of Modigliani and et al;  and  (2) German model; 
  and (3) The UK model;  The author, then, justifies a minus rate of return in 
the government sector, by seting consumption coeficient/national taste = 1, under the neutrality of 
wages and consumption in the government sector.
s d iG G= +Δ : sG ≤ −0 03. sG = −0 01. ,
sG = −0 02. , sG = −0 02. .
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1. The higher the balance of payments to output the higher the growth rate of output at con-
vergence, assuming that the level of deficits and debts is given. It is indispensable for an 
economy to increase investment in order to decrease a huge positive balance of payments. 
If the balance of payments is minus, it is indispensable to increase the saving of the total 
economy (by using tax redistribution function) assuming that investment is given. Never-
theless, if investment increases at a rapid rate continuously over years, the economy wil 
get into a developed stage soon, resulting in a low growth rate of output at convergence 
due to the existence of an upper limit of the capital-output ratio.
2. Assuming that the balance of payments and the capital-output ratio, W = K / Y, are given, 
the higher positively the rate of increase/decrease in net investment the higher the growth 
rate of output at convergence, and vice versa. Note that the qualitative investment to total 
investment, 1 - b*, cannot easily rise up at above W = 3, even if R & D, education, and 
human capital are input much. This is justified by the elasticity of 1 - b* w. r. t. W (see 
Figure 1). Investment must be qualitatively examined and investment is endogenously 
divided into qualitative and quantitative investments.
3. The higher the ratio of net investment to output, i = I / Y, the higher the growth rate of out-
put but, at the sacrifice of the higher W . This implies that an optimum i = I / Y exists at 
between 0.1 and 0.2. Note that the rate of technological progress,   mostly 
depends on i = I / Y. Assume that the government share of output, YG / Y, is 0.15 and i = 
0.2, then an optimum iG/Y = 0.03 = 0.15×0.2 is obtained. The higher negatively the level 
of Dd the higher the value of YG / Y. In this respect, the upper limit of Dd = -0.03 in the 
EMU rule is theoreticaly justified at = 0.15 and i = 0.2 or iG/Y = 0.03, which is within 
the range of optimum.
4. If the level of government net investment to GDP is 3% as derived above (neglecting the 
diference between GDP and output Y = C + S), the EMU rule implies that government sav-
ing (to output) must be zero. What does SG = 0 mean? SG = 0 guarantees a minimum 
growth rate of output in the government sector. The government saving to GDP or output 
is, in a sense, a final indicator of this rule.11) With the change in net investment, the BOP 
and saving move positively or negatively in paralel. This is a fact-base yet without further 
g iA
* *( ),= −1 β
Y
Y
G
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11) This situation realizes Arow’s (1970) unique rate of return in an economy, where the rate of return 
of the private sector equals that of the total economy. The author advocates that if government sav-
ing is more or less than zero, then the rate of return wil be more or less than zero, where an idea 
that government should not earn money in budgeting is denied.
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extending to endogenous ratios.
5. The solvency of primary balance in De Grauwe’s diferential at the continuous time is 
replaced by the endogenous cost of capital at the discrete time. The cost of capital with the 
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Figure 8　The characteristics of the valuation ratio and its maximum at debt = 0
Note: Top of this figure shows the characteristics of the valuation ratio, where the vertical 
asymptote crosses the origin of  Botom of this figure shows that the 
maximum/optimum of the valuation ratio holds only at deficit = 0 and debt = 0. Case 3-
1 shows the upper limit of the EMU rule. Case 3-2 shows Dd = -0.015 and d = -0.3. 
Each valuation ratio is much lower than 1.0, in particular when the increase/decrease rate 
of net investment is positive. Case 3-3 has no deficit and no debt in an economy. The 
valuation ratio of Case 3-3 shows highest value stably regardless of the increase/decrease 
rate of net investment. Case 3-4 has surplus and lending (Dd and d are positive) yet, the 
valuation ratio is much lower than that of Case 3-3, though it is stil above 1.0.
r gY
* * .− = 0
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changes in net investment under four cases is optimized at Dd = d = 0 as wel as the valua-
tion ratio (see Figure 8 with Eq. 10-2). The higher negatively the level of deficits and 
debts, the lower the valuation ratio, which fals below 1.0. The higher the level of surplus 
and lending, the higher the valuation ratio remains above 1.0. This implies that the smaler 
the deficits and debts the more healthy an economy is. The higher positively the change in 
net investment the more d = D / Y increases. The higher negatively the change in net invest-
ment the more d = D / Y decreases. Al of these results are traced back to the change in 
technology: it is indispensable for an economy to decrease government investment unless 
  is guaranteed.
6. The comparison of the interest rate of r(DEBT) with the rate of return at convergence, r
*, is 
useful to the corection of financial policy12): r(DEBT) - r
* and/or r(DEBT) / r
*. The interest rate 
for the long-term is based on the market principle and holds with the least risk of national 
debts. The rate of return at convergence is based on the endogenous growth model and con-
nects it with the relative share of output and the capital-output ratio in the real assets. The 
central bank must be rigidly neutral to arbitrary decision-making: r(DEBT) > r
* (often as in 
the US) is preferable to r(DEBT) < r
* (as in Japan for many years). As a guideline, the former 
is more responsible to the next generations than the later.
7. Finaly, d = D / Y = -60% in the EMU upper limit is externaly justified using the theoreti-
cal capital-output ratio, W = K / Y, even when the set of equations are not measured: 
Assume W = 2.5 on average among countries in the world, and define dD/K º -D / K. Then, 
d = -60% is expressed by dD/K = 24% = 0.6/2.5. Define the theoretical leverage of debts to 
equity or national wealth: lEV º dD/K/(1-dD/K). Then, the leverage is 30.16% = 0.24/0.76 
under an assumption that debts are only used for capital. For example, if dD/Y = 2.0 (as in 
Japan, using national disposable income instead of GDP), the leverage wil be lEV = 400% 
= 0.8/(1 - 0.8) using W = 2.5 and dD/K = 80% = 2.0/2.5. If the actual capital-output is used, 
Wactual = 3.7, the actual leverage wil be; lEV = 117% = 0.54/0.46 under dD/K = 54% = 
2.0/3.7. Note that W = 2.5 is a common criterion for sustainability in the global world that 
controls the relationship between the relative share of capital and the rate of return by coun-
try. The higher the leverage the higher the risk of debts, where a concept of non-risk does 
not hold: the interest rate of debts wil turn to risk-bearing, unless the private sector vividly 
absorbs the heavy burden of debts that depresses the total economy.
1 1− > −β βG* *
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12) The relationship between real assets and financial assets wil be discussed using the Marshal’s k = 
M / Y and comparing this k with the author’s theoretical capital-output ratio in a separate paper.
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6.　Conclusions
The EMU fiscal rule was set empiricaly. The author proved that the fiscal rule was mode-
st, as shown by endogenous findings in this paper. The upper limit of 3% deficit to output, Dd 
= DD/Y, is replaced by zero government saving under a sustainable level of the ratio of net 
investment to output in an open economy, where the balance of payments and budget are simul-
taneously taken into consideration. The upper limit of 60% debts to output, d = D/Y, is con-
verted to the theoretical leverage by connecting dD/K º -D/K with the theoretical-output ratio. 
D/Y = -60% corresponds with 30% of the leverage under W = 2.0. These results are stable and 
ready for chalenges. Also, the more modest an economy the closer the interest rate of debts to 
the rate of return at convergence, as shown by the Petersburg coeficient.
The quantitative net investment to the sum of qualitative and quantitative investment meas-
ured by sector is a supreme criterion to fiscal policy, since the valuation ratio   is 
replaced by  The maximized level of the valuation ratio is only realized at Dd = 
0 and d = 0. And, the higher the capital-output ratio the higher the b* is. Therefore, it is inevi-
table for policy-makers to have the capital-output lower and this is maintained by converting 
physical capital to human capital.
The condition for primary balance set by De Grauwe (ibid., 225) was tested by connecting 
deficits with debts, primarily comparing the interest rate of debts with the rate of return of the 
government sector in the financial degree of solvency and, replacing the diference of the inter-
est rate and the external growth rate of output by an endogenous cost of capital and its valuation 
ratio at convergence, in the endogenous degree of solvency. The results of De Grauwe’s equa-
tion using Japan and the US 1997–2005 (see Figure 6) do not contradict with the results of 
‘dynamic efficiency’ in the literature (for comparison, see Abel et al (1989)), where if the 
growth rate of output is lower than the interest rate, the condition for solvency of debts wil be 
wel maintained. The dynamic eficiency is tested using the Petersburg coeficient between the 
rate of return and the growth rate of output each at convergence or directly using the cost of 
capital and the valuation ratio each at convergence.
The growth rate of output at convergence of the total economy is higher if the balance of 
payments (BOP) is positively higher and vice versa, so that the saving at BOP = 0 is a base for 
any country. The growth rate of output at convergence of the government sector, on the other 
hand, remains unchanged if the ratio of net investment to output and the theoretical capital-out-
r r gY
* * */( )−
α α β/( ).*− ⋅i
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put ratio remain unchanged regardless of whether or not the levels of deficits and debts are 
extremely minus. Nevertheless, the relative share of capital and the rate of return of the govern-
ment sector strongly reflect the levels of deficits and debts: the more minus deficits and debts, 
the more minus these ratios of the government sector. These results in the long run influence the 
BOP and variables of the private sector and the total economy, through the aggravation of the 
capital-output ratio.
The government share of output, where taxes equal government output, reflects these 
results: the more minus deficits and debts the more the government share of output (as an 
expression of a large government). Here is much room for choosing alternative policies among 
people and policy-makers. As a result, if deficits and debts are more minus, the cost of capital 
of the government sector is more minus and accordingly, the valuation ratio is below 1.0, where 
national net wealth reduces. In adverse, if surplus and lending are plus, the valuation ratio is 
above 1.0 and national net wealth increases.
The author assumed in this paper that the diferential of the level of high-powered money 
was zero, similarly to De Grauwe. The author wil test the above neutrality by comparing the 
Marshal’s k with the author’s capital-output ratio in a separate paper.
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Table 1　Simulation of the endogenous fiscal rule, commonly to al the cases
Note: Case 1 changes ‘net investment’ of the total economy, Case 2 that of the government sec-
tor and, Case 3 changes those of the total economy and the government sector. DD/Y = 
-0.03 and D/Y = -0.6 in Sub-case 1, DD/Y = -0.015 and D/Y = -0.3 in Sub-case 2, DD/Y 
= 0.0 and D/Y = 00 in Sub-case 3, and DD/Y = 0.03 and D/Y = 0.1 in Sub-case 4. In this 
table, results are the same, regardless of the combination of the changes in net invest-
ments of the total economy and the G sector. The qualitative net investment to total net 
investment of the government sector, 1-b* (G), however, difers by case but, slightly. This 
implies that fiscal policy does not influence technological improvement in the short-run. 
In the long-run, fiscal policy influences technological progress via the aggravation of the 
capital-output ratio of the government sector.
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Table 2　Simulation of basic data in the endogenous fiscal rule: Case 3
Note: Case 3 shows the results closer to the real world when the changes in net investments of 
the total economy and the government sector occur at the same time. This table shows 
three current values used for the solvency of debts in De Grauwe, P. (2005) and also 
three theoretical basic ratios at convergence of the capital-output ratio, the relative share 
of capital, and the rate of return, each of the government sector, where aG = WG・rG. The 
government share of output, YG/Y, is used for connecting the government sector’s value 
with the total economy’s.
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Table 3　The cost of capital and the valuation ratio in the endogenous fiscal rule
Note: The cost of capital and the valuation ratio show an essence of the endogenous fiscal rule. 
These optimum values exist when both deficits and debts are zero. The higher deficits 
and debts are the higher the valuation ratio below 1.0 and, the higher surplus and lending 
are the higher the valuation ratio above 1.0, where the horizontal asymptote is 1.0, by set-
ting the cost of capital at the X axis.
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Table 4　New relationship between deficits and debts: from De Grauwe’s (2005) to the endogenous 
fiscal rule
Note: De Grauwe (2005, 225) forms a necessary condition of solvency of debts in the continu-
ous time, by making deficit equal to the product of debts and the diference between the 
external interest rate, r(DEBT), and a given growth rate of GDP; rDEBT - gY .The necessary 
condition only holds when deficits and debts are both zero in the discrete time. Kamiryo 
(2007, 63–64) forms an endogenous cost of capital at convergence in the discrete time, r*-
gY 
*, which corresponds with the above difference of De Grauwe’s. The differences 
between r(DEBT) and r
* and between gY - g
* 
Y are the keys to bury the two frameworks.
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Table A1　De Grauwe’s (2005, 225) condition for primary solvency: 1997–2005
Note: Deficit DD, debt D, and interest paid R(DEBT), each are shown as minus, to distinguish 
surplus, lending, and interest received, each shown as plus.
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Table A2　Specific simulation of deficits and debts: four cases of Japan 1997–2005
Note: Deficit DD, debt D, and interest paid R(DEBT), each are shown as minus, to distinguish 
surplus, lending, and interest received, each shown as plus.
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Table A3　De Grauwe’s (2005, 225) condition for primary solvency: the US 1997–2005
Note: Deficit DD, debt D, and interest paid R(DEBT), each are shown as minus, to distinguish 
surplus, lending, and interest received, each shown as plus.
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Table A4　Specific simulation of deficits and debts: four cases of the US 1997–2005
Note: Deficit DD, debt D, and interest paid R(DEBT), each are shown as minus, to distinguish 
surplus, lending, and interest received, each shown as plus.
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Table A5　Simulation 3.1 & 3.2 of the EMU rule to deficits and debts: a developed country
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Table A6　Simulation 3.3 & 3.4 of the EMU rule to deficits and debts: a developed country
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Table A7　Simulation 3.1 & 3.2 of the EMU rule to deficits and debts: a developing country
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Table A8　Simulation 3.3 & 3.4 of the EMU rule to deficits and debts: a developing country
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Appendix: Tables AA1 to AA8 show the results of simulations in the degree of financial solvency and 
those in the endogenous degree of solvency: under ‘the BOP’ or ‘DD & D’
Table AA1　Simulation 1.1 & 1.2 of the EMU rule to deficits and debts: a developed country
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Table AA2　Simulation 1.3 & 1.4 of the EMU rule to deficits and debts: a developed country
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Table AA3　Simulation 2.1 & 2.2 of the EMU rule to deficits and debts: a developed country
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Table AA4　Simulation 2.3 & 2.4 of the EMU rule to deficits and debts: a developed country
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Table AA5　Simulation 1.1 & 1.2 of the EMU rule to deficits and debts: a developing country
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Table AA6　Simulation 1.3 & 1.4 of the EMU rule to deficits and debts: a developing country
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Table AA7　Simulation 2.1 & 2.2 of the EMU rule to deficits and debts: a developing country
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Table AA8　Simulation 2.3 & 2.4 of the EMU rule to deficits and debts: a developing country
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Figure AA1　p = Dd/d as a sort of the internal rate of return: Japan and the US 1997–2005
Note: Case 1XXX shows the actual situation by year, where g* Y ¹ Dd/d ¹ r(DEBT).
 Case 4OOO shows the actual situation by year, where g* Y = Dd/d = r(DEBT).
 This Figure shows an overal image to Tables 1 to 4, soon below, that deepen the implica-
tions of Du Grauwe’s (2005) equations.
